Ninth Circuit Narrowly Interprets the “Learned Professional” Exemption
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently upheld a narrow interpretation of the FLSA overtime exemption relating to “learned professionals.” In Solis v. State of Washington (No. 10-35590 – September 9, 2011), the Ninth Circuit reversed a District Court’s ruling finding the State of Washington’s Department of Social and Health Services (“DSHS”) had correctly classified certain social workers as “learned professionals” and therefore were exempt under the FLSA’s overtime pay requirements. Instead, the Ninth Circuit held that DSHS had failed to “plainly and unmistakably” meet the regulatory requirements that an employer availing itself of the “learned professional” exemption must show that a position requires advanced knowledge customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized intellectual instruction.
The FLSA requires that employers pay overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of forty hours in a week unless a particular exemption applies. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). FLSA exemptions are narrowly construed against employers and are to be withheld except as to persons plainly and unmistakably within their terms and spirit. It is the employer’s burden to prove that an employee meets every requirement before an employee will be deprived of the protection of the FLSA.
There are three prongs to the “learned professional” exemption: (1) the employee must perform work requiring advanced knowledge; (2) the advanced knowledge must be in a field of science or learning; and (3) the advanced knowledge must be customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized intellectual instruction. 29 C.F.R. § 541.301.
In Solis, the Ninth Circuit focused on the third prong of the exemption – a prolonged course of specialized intellectual instruction. Because the Court had not previously addressed this provision, it relied on sister circuit determinations to find that positions that do not require a particular course of intellectual instruction directly related to the employee’s professional duties do not come within the “learned professional” exemption, even if they also require substantial practical experience.
In finding that DSHS did not satisfy its burden of proving the exemption, the Ninth Circuit held that “[a]n educational requirement that may be satisfied by degrees in fields as diverse as anthropology, education, criminal justice, and gerontology does not call for a ‘course of specialized intellectual instruction.’” The Court further held that the “requirement of a degree or sufficient coursework in any of the several fields broadly related to a position suggests that only general academic training is necessary, with the employer relying upon apprenticeship and experience to develop the advanced skills necessary for effective performance as a social worker.”
Even specialized training provided by the employer to employees is not enough to satisfy the requirement of the exemption absent a prolonged course of specialized intellectual instruction. The Court stated that if additional training were sufficient to qualify as a specialized course of intellectual instruction, nearly every position with a formal training program would qualify. The Court also knocked down DSHS’ argument that each social worker was required to have 18 months of experience in social work. The exemption does not apply to occupations in which most employees have acquired their skill by experience.
The Take-Away: Employers must make sure that they are correctly classifying employees. The Solis case is another indication that the courts, as well as the DOL, are interpreting FLSA requirements narrowly. When in doubt, audit job classifications routinely and contact legal counsel.

